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SERVICES CONTRACTS: THE FORGOTTEN
SECTOR OF COMMERCIAL LAW
Raymond T. Nimmer*
"Have we left anything out?" asked the blind man. "No, that's
the wrong question," said the young person in the dark cloak.
"The question is not if you have left anything out, but why?
Where are services agreements, technology licenses, intellectual
property contracts?"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code is obsolete in its coverage in Article
2 and in its cousin, Article 2A.1 These articles constitute the basic con-
tract law of the Code. They deal with important issues, but fail to ad-
dress topics that are more significant. Their scope reflects a goods bias.
That bias has shaped basic contract law since before the 1950s. But as
years progress, the basic contract law provisions become increasingly
mismatched to the modem economy. The emphasis on goods reflects an
industrial economy that is in fact being supplanted by an information
and services based, global economic system. Today, the UCC shows the
indelible traces of a world view perpetuated past its time and receding
from center stage as the economy shifts.
A Code that deals with some major areas of contract law cannot be
entirely obsolete. But by failing to cover active, relevant fields of com-
merce that already outstrip goods in economic importance, Article 2 be-
comes marginal in its relevance and almost quaint in its world view.
What it does, it does well, but it leaves out so much that it is woefully
incomplete. In this latter sense, the UCC suffers from a subject-matter
obsolescence which, if not a terminal illness, describes an acute failure of
the heart and soul of the codification movement.
* Reporter on Technology Issues, Drafting Committee to Revise UCC Article 2; Profes-
sor of Law, University of Houston Law Center; Of Counsel to Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Hous-
ton, Texas; J.D., 1968, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1. There are many ways to document the failure to deal with modem themes. The UCC
largely excludes consumer law and real estate transactions. These areas of law contain impor-
tant issues that, with few exceptions, fall outside the UCC. There are reasons that may justify
exclusion of real estate transactions and consumer law, including their historic tendency to
involve parties with local rather than national affiliations. This "historic tendency" may no
longer define actual practice, but I leave that issue for another day.
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This Essay focuses on services contracts and the basic contract law
of the UCC. The services industry constitutes the single largest sector of
commerce in the United States today. Services already exceed goods in
economic importance and continue to grow at a far more rapid pace.
Many services contracts involve the production or transfer of intangibles
such as data, technology and intellectual property. These represent ma-
jor factors in the modem "information age." But contracts for services
are covered in the UCC in only a marginal, limited and indirect manner.
Article 2 excludes services contracts unless the sale of "goods" predomi-
nates in a transaction. Contracts that transfer intangibles are currently
not dealt with at all.
Why? The only answers lie in historical oddities and scope decisions
made in far different economic times. The current scope of Article 2
stems from decisions in the 1950s joined to a modem unwillingness to
revisit those decisions in light of modem practice and economic systems.
Article 2A is a recent exception to this unwillingness driven, one sup-
poses, by a particular industry and a compact group of controversial
issues.
We need to reassess not whether specific contracts are within the
UCC as currently drafted, but whether redrafting Article 2 without deal-
ing with these fields of commercial contracting makes any sense. A UCC
that deals only with sales and leases of goods dwells on the the commerce
of yesterday, ignores the reality of today, and fails to respond to the inevi-
table challenges of the future. Should our priorities continue to be bound
by a focus on goods? More fundamentally, can the UCC be treated as a
modem commercial code when it excludes significant areas and thereby
ignores or mischaracterizes what is today's definition of commercial
practice?
I argue that it cannot. What we need, instead, is both a revised
structure and a revised scope for basic contract law in the UCC. Ulti-
mately, the scope of contract law under the Code should cover not only
sales of goods and leasing, but also licensing of intangibles and con-
tracting for services. The scope should, in essence, expand to cover areas
of commerce that are relevant in light of today's and tomorrow's com-
mercial practices. We also need a revised structure that permits the
growth and expansion of the UCC as the economy transforms in the face
of modem technology and commercial practice.
A hub-and-spoke approach to the design of basic contract law prin-
ciples is appropriate. The hub consists of general principles applicable to
all forms of commercial contracting. The spokes are subparts or related
articles that concentrate on issues specifically relevant to selected and
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important transactions, tailoring standards and default rules to fit and
foster commercial practice. The first step in this direction came in ad-
ding leases to the UCC. Another, more significant step involves adding
commercial services contracts.
II. OBSOLESCENCE AND PRIORITY
The current scope of the UCC reflects choices of policy priority, not
historic or theoretical purity. While Llewellyn, Gilmore and their col-
leagues made choices in the 1950s about what should be included in the
UCC, they merely adopted priorities that were reasonable to them at that
time.' Their choices do not state fundamental truths. But the practical
and political scope choices they made are no longer appropriate. Ex-
cluded contracts are more significant today than the topics included in
the UCC. The excluded contracts present more demanding policy
choices and issues of doctrine, as well as more vibrant and growing eco-
nomic contexts.
The modem Code dwells on a narrow segment of commercial prac-
tice. If the themes selected in the 1950s still represented either the most
important areas of law or those most susceptible to codification, relying
on the old decisions would be sensible. But they do not. If the UCC did
not exist and you chose from scratch what types of contracts a uniform
code should address, would you select nonconsumer sales of goods and
personal property leases as the most important? I think not. But basic
contract law in Articles 2 and 2A focuses on these subjects.
Even though commercial services are widely significant, we treat the
sale and exchange of items as the focus of commerce and commercial
contract law.' Services contracts are relegated to a secondary position
folded into uncodified law and are seldom examined as an independent
part of commercial law. Yet, the modem national economy is a services
economy existing in an information age.4 These two descriptions of the
U.S. economy share a close nexus and stem from similar events. Infor-
mation, communications and transportation technology enable the ex-
pansion of both the services and information producing sectors of
commerce. These technologies have transformed what was once a transi-
tory, nonstorable and nonreusable commercial asset into one that can be
2. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341
(1948).
3. See KARL P. SAUVANT, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES: THE POLI-
TICS OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS 18-22 (1986).
4. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTERNATIONAL COMPETI-
TIVENESS IN SERVICES 22 (1987).
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delivered across the country by national providers, and whose outputs
are often retained and retrievable at will. At the same time that product
manufacturing is being truncated, automated or shifted to offshore loca-
tions, the services sector is burgeoning.
Services and the exchange relationships they entail challenge many
preconceptions about law, social relationships and traditional categories
of legal analysis. We see reactions to these changes in many contexts.
Perhaps the most significant for a discussion of the UCC are develop-
ments in international trade negotiations. This forum reflects multina-
tional judgments about modem commercial values and the direction in
which commerce is evolving. While international trade analyses histori-
cally focused entirely on trade in goods, the discussions now include, for
the first time, a direct focus on trade in services and intangibles., It may
not be necessary that the UCC mirror this change, but the fact that the
change occurred indicates that traditional boundaries of commerce and
commercial law are being redrawn. The driving force behind this change
flows from the services and information sectors.
Commercial contracts between services providers and their clients
include various important contractual relationships. These range across
subject-matter areas such as design services, transportation, program-
ming, consulting, drilling, security management, commodities trading,
maintenance, repair, data processing, opinion surveys, training, advertis-
ing, research and development, accounting, entertainment, financial
planning, communications, investment management and information
services. While the subject-matter diversity appears daunting, the range
of contract law issues is no greater than the diversity involved in transac-
tions in goods. The difference between a contract to design an office and
a contract to repair an elevator is no greater than the difference between
a contract to buy a toaster and a contract to sell liquid helium. And this
is just the every-day commercial world.
The law on services contracts comes from both common law and
scattered statutes. It contains an array of uncertain legal doctrines. In
contrast, commercial sales of goods are governed by articulate, codified
rules, which receive extensive attention in legal literature and are being
5. See generally A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in
Services in the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987) (dis-
cussing inclusion of new subject matter, including intellectual property rights and trade in
services, in Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations); Paul E. Geller, Can the GATT Incorpo-
rate Berne Whole?, 4 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 193 (1990) (discussing proposals in Uru-
guay Round regarding trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights); Joel H. Reichman,
Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747 (1989) (same).
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rewritten for a second time in forty years to reflect modem develop-
ments. The imbalance could not be more blatant, nor could it be more
unfortunate. It is time, actually long past time, to include services con-
tracts in the UCC.
III. THE SCOPE OF NECESSARY CODE CHANGES: ISSUES AND
CRITERIA
How does one decide whether to include or exclude an entire area of
contract law from codification in the UCC? The criteria are seldom dis-
cussed and are surprisingly obscure. Since the initial scope decisions in
the 1950s, the question of subject-matter inclusion or exclusion seldom
has been revisited. The two exceptions are Articles 2A and 4A, both of
which focus on narrow industries or types of transactions. The history of
these changes, however, suggests several criteria for including a new field
of contracting in the UCC.6 To qualify:
(1) the area should have economic significance (the volume principle);
(2) it should be a field that can benefit from codification (the relevance
principle);
(3) it should be national in practice (the national principle);
(4) the area should have subject-matter and policy elements that distin-
guish it from already codified sectors (the uniqueness principle); and
(5) the codification task must be reasonably achievable (the feasibility
principle).
In a modem world characterized by rapid movement of value, in-
stantaneous communications and state boundaries that have less signifi-
cance in national trade, codification most often provides an appropriate
alternative to patched together common-law developments. If volume,
relevance and national scope exist in a given contracting area, as in serv-
ices, there should be a presumption favoring codification.
A. The Volume Principle
An area of commercial contract law should not be codified unless
the topic has sufficient scope to justify the effort and there is some reason
to believe that codification will benefit commercial practice.7 Because
6. See Gilmore, supra note 2; Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification of Commercial
Contract Law, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 465, 469-81 (1992).
7. Having stated the obvious, one must recognize that the criteria for inclusion are not
always clear. Sales of goods and secured transactions in goods were important commercial
topics in the 1950s and 1960s, and remain so today. It is less clear that bulk sales, investment
securities and domestic letters of credit were equally important when included in the UCC.
While these areas are included, the UCC excludes contracts for commercial services, transac-
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codification activities work with limited resources, they must focus on
topics that count.
Services contracts count. They dominate the modem economy.
Services transactions cover a wide and growing range of business and
account for a more substantial portion of the economic system than
transactions in goods. They affect all aspects of society, both in this
country and internationally.
A useful comparison can be drawn between services contracts and
the two topics most recently brought into the Code: personal property
leases (Article 2A) and funds transfers (Article 4A). A justification for
Article 4A was that funds transfers deal with huge amounts of money
and that "[t]here is no comprehensive body of law that defines the rights
and obligations that arise from wire transfers."' 8 Yet, transactions cov-
ered by Article 4A occur in relatively narrow economic and commercial
strata. While massive amounts of money are transferred, few litigated
d:sputes arise. The volume and importance criteria here focus solely on
the amount of money involved, not the scope of the activity in terms of
how many different actors and areas of commerce are affected.
The justification for Article 2A also concentrated on the importance
of leasing, yet the value of personal property leases pales in comparison
to the dollars involved in commercial services contracting. While litiga-
tion regarding commercial leases was common prior to the adoption of
Article 2A, most of the litigation largely dealt with tax law and with the
intersection between Article 2A and secured financing law. Article 2A
properly goes far beyond these issues, dealing broadly with the lease rela-
tionship and creating a codified body of law that effectively guides trans-
acting parties through the legal issues.
Funds transfers and leases are important and should be covered by
the UCC. Services contracts are even more important and permeate
modem commercial practice to a far greater extent. If a case based on
importance can be made for either funds transfer or leasing, that case has
far greater weight in reference to services contracts.
B. The Relevance Principle
Mere commercial importance does not mandate codification. The
relevance principle states that before one attempts to codify, there must
be a reason to believe that codification will benefit commerce. One meas-
tions in intangibles (other than security interests) and transactions in real estate. Today, it
could hardly be argued that these are less frequent, less economically significant and less com-
mercial in nature than are topics brought under the umbrella of the UCC.
8. U.C.C. § 4A prefatory note (1990).
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ures benefit by the extent to which codification promotes commercial de-
velopment and makes contracting more efficient and effective, while
remaining sensitive to competing public policies. One codifies an area of
contract law because codification better serves policy and practical needs
than a common law governed by judicial rulings coupled with scattered
statutes enacted among the fifty states.
It is easy to mischaracterize the potential benefits of codification. In
a decision whether or not tO undertake a codification project, the rele-
vant benefits do not lie solely in resolving current litigation or disputed
contract issues. The focus does not center on the courtroom per se, but
on negotiation and planning. Will codified rules expedite contracting or,
at least, remove potential obstacles? The optimal goal is to facilitate and
support the commercial transaction itself, not primarily to establish rules
that yield "fair" results in litigation. Herein lies a fundamental point
about commercial contract law. Uncertainty about the rule that applies
often engenders uncertainty and error in negotiation: This adds costs to
commercial transactions. More certain and commercially relevant rules,
on the other hand, facilitate contracting.
The benefits of undertaking a process of codification do not lie pri-
marily in any particular rule that might eventually be promulgated. For
example, one should not begin a project to codify services law because of
a desire for a new rule on disclaimers. The initial benefits lie in method
and form. The eventual substantive rules depend on consensus and the
political context of the statutory enactment that cannot be forecast at the
outset.
Codification is a process. It yields a type of product. The content of
that product varies with variations in subject matter. Both the process
and the general character of the product are significant. Both yield bene-
fits not produced in common law.
The process consists of an extensive examination of commercial
practice, commercial law and contract policy in an open forum con-
ducted over a period of years during which all interested groups can par-
ticipate. This process is in stark contrast to common law. In court,
litigants debate specific disputed issues. Common law evolves through
the accumulated knowledge and shared inferences. Its rules are gener-
ated by numerous disputes played out in different courtrooms by differ-
ent litigants debating similar points. This takes time. It ordinarily leaves
significant gaps in reasoning and consistency among the states. Further-
more, in our modern era, common law goes hand in hand with scattered
state statutes. Legislatures respond to local conditions and lobbying with
statutes that augment or alter the common law. A national codification
April 1993]
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project is better suited for the development of coherent, commercially
relevant standards for contract law than is the common-law process.
Theproduct of codification is a single document stating basic law in
relatively explicit terms. This document serves a variety of functions.
Developed in a national forum, the codification carries weight that
reduces local willingness to adopt a policy directly at odds with national
norms. This yields relative consistency. Furthermore, by placing many
basic rules in a single document, codification enhances the accessibility of
contract law, especially as accessibility is gauged by reference to parties
that lack the time, resources or expertise to engage in extended legal re-
search. Both consistency and accessibility reduce the costs and the risks
associated with agreements entered into by commercial parties in a na-
tional, even global market.
In contrast, common-law decisions and augmenting statutes often
yield scattered, incomplete and contradictory rules. These can be dis-
cerned and understood by commercial parties only through labored re-
search and analysis or by hiring legal experts. Local variations are the
norm, rather than the exception. The codification product generally
yields a more readily discernable, consistent approach to contract issues
than its common-law counterpart.
The relevance principle thus causes one to ask whether an area of
contract law would benefit by a process that supplants common law with
an open forum for multilateral discussion, and that creates a code con-
taining a central statement of legal principles. Ordinarily, the answer is
yes. Contract law benefits from codification unless federal law already
establishes stable and discernible rules. Services contract law consists of
often obscure common-law principles and state-by-state diversity. The
process of examining fundamental commercial principles and, ideally, in-
corporating them into a coherent statement of law in enforceable form
would provide significant advantages.
The codification process also shapes the content of the eventual legal
rules in a way that encourages and supports commercial practices.
Courts exist to resolve specific disputes. In the absence of codified law,
judicial rulings often seek standards that enhance contextual fairness in
individual disputes and that rely on litigation to solve problems. Neither
approach serves well to protect commercial interests. In contrast, codifi-
cation deals with broad ideas divorced of specific disputes in a forum in
which numerous interests are represented. This more likely yields rules
that facilitate commercial contracting and makes commercially appropri-
ate choices about where and to what extent commercial interests should
predominate in light of commercial and countervailing interests.
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A first principle in commercial law is that a norm of contract free-
dom and flexibility best fosters commerce because it enables the parties
to tailor a transaction to their own needs. Is freedom of contract better
served by codification, or by common-law and local statute development?
The record favors a conclusion that codes best preserve and foster con-
tractual freedom. This principle of contract freedom explicitly permeates
the UCC. It is mandated in those rules that establish default principles
relating to the relationship between contracting parties. 9 Contract free-
dom, of course, also characterizes many common-law contract rules.
However, while many common-law rules encourage contract freedom,
the converse illustrations are too numerous, too recent and too compel-
ling to ignore. Modem courts sharply disagree about the proper scope of
contract freedom. 10 A codification in the UCC is more likely to contain
explicit safeguards for freedom of contract than a purely common-law
development.
The codification process also affects "default" rules in dontractlaw.
As a general rule, codification is more likely to yield commerce-
facilitating default rules.
Where contract freedom dominates, the parties themselves define
the terms of their bargain. Contract law plays an indirect role through
"gap-filling" or "default" rules that govern in the absence of contract
terms to the contrary." The ideal default rule reflects commercial expec-
9. For a recent illustration, see the official comment to UCC § 2A-101: "This codifica-
tion was greatly influenced by the fundamental tenet of the common law as it has developed
with respect to leases of goods: freedom of the parties to contract ... subject to certain limita-
tions including those that relate to the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care." U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. As a matter of UCCjurisprudence, there is a subsidiary premise
that, in the absence of express terms on a disputed point, contract law should prefer a judicial
resolution guided by general standards of commercial and contextual reasonableness, rather
than controlled by an explicit default rule. Some contest this premise, arguing that default
rules ought to be discernible and fixed to minimize the need for court action to define the rights
of the parties in the absence of an express, contrary agreement.
10. Lender liability litigation is one illustration of conflict. See Helen D. Chaitman, The
Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability, 22 UCC L.J. 3 (1989); ef. Kham & Nate's
Shoes No. 2 v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[F]irms that have negotiated
contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their trading
partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good faith.' "). Another area is in reference to
noncompetition clauses. See, ag., ROGER MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS 3-67 (1967); RAYMOND
T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 3.10[3] (2d ed. 1992) (discussing con-
flict over enforceability of noncompetition clauses).
11. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261
(1985) (suggesting that predictability of explicit default rules may provide incentive to adopt
those rules, rather than to create new terminology or relationship for contract).
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tations and contains sufficient flexibility to allow for changes in evolving
contract practice.
12
Discernible, commercially sensible rules support commerce in nu-
merous ways. They fill in gaps with appropriate standards and provide a
benchmark against which bargains can be drafted without having to ne-
gotiate or account for all elements of a relationship in detail. Having
access to established principles also reduces the burden or load that a
written contract must carry; this facilitates agreement. 13 Also, because
many commercial contracts involve no bargaining and are not tailored to
a particular deal, default rules for such transactions should provide rea-
sonably contoured relationships.
In these respects, codification more reliably yields relevant default
terms than does a common-law process of litigation and uncoordinated
local statutes. This is true because the process develops default rules
through consultation with groups of experts and practitioners. These
participants in the "real world" of commerce supply information about
ordinary practices and commercial expectations in a setting divorced
from a litigation context. This input is vital. In contrast, a court relies
on the arguments of litigants, their limited and self-interested perspective
and their self-selected, paid experts. While some judges see past the
thicket of dispute-centered presentations, others do not. The common-
law process is not conducive to the development of commercially rele-
vant rules.
This is especially true for services contracts, in which the match be-
tween current law and current practice is unknown and created by hap-
penstance. Current legal principles are embedded in general common-
law contract rules that evolved without specific or consistent attention to
the commercial services sector.
C. The National Principle
A codification topic should be national in scope. This national prin-
ciple refers to two issues. One is that the contracting field and the issues
12. Gilmore, supra note 2.
13. These are not always best served by rules that do no more than provide a legal theory
for litigation. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that omitted essential terms of a
contract should be filled by a court adopting a term "which is reasonable in the circum-
stances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981). See generally Richard E.
Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785
(1982) (discussing use of Restatement (Second) of Contracts as guideline in contract formation
and interpretation). While a default or gap-filling term earmarked as "reasonable" often pro-
vides the only way to deal with an omitted contract term, this language invites rather than
forecloses litigation. Such terms may not always be appropriate for commercial contract law.
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it raises must concern and impact most states and regions of the country.
The second is that the area of contracting should be characterized by
national, rather than purely local participation.
The national principle thus focuses both on the importance of the
subject and on a characteristic of codification that identifies one of its
chief benefits: the role of codes in promoting contract practice by creat-
ing accessible understandable legal rules against which the contract can
be measured.
Consider what default rule governs whether delivery of a slightly
damaged product breaches a contract for the sale of a television, and
contrast this with the default rule that governs whether a brief delay in
completing work breaches a consulting contract. More to the point, how
would you-or the contracting parties-discover the appropriate rule in
your own state or in another state? For the television, UCC Article 2
provides the reference point, and the general rule will be the same in
most states.1 4 The answer for the consulting contract lies in domrorl-
law rules. One might turn to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for a
general principle, but the Restatement principles have not been adopted
in all states; answers for particular states would depend on relevant case
law, particularly the extent of common-law development of the concepts
of material breach and substantial performance for services.
Both bodies of law can be discovered and applied, but codified rules
are more readily accessible and tend to be more uniform across jurisdic-
tions. Uncodified services contract law does not thus become entirely
inaccessible. It is merely difficult to find and apply, especially on a na-
tional basis. This imposes avoidable costs on contracting. These costs
are especially important in industries in which national practice is signifi-
cant. Variations in local law hinder national operation. Elimination of
these variations represents a potentially significant contribution from
uniform, national codification. These more uniform rules level the com-
mercial playing field for both large companies that have the expertise and
the resources to undertake a search for applicable law and small firms
that cannot afford to do so.
The national principle does not demand that all transactions in an
area involve national actors. If that were true, no contract law could
14. U.C.C. § 2-601. The UCC standard specifies that if the goods "fail in any respect to
conform to the contract" the buyer may reject the delivery. Id. This adopts the "perfect
tender" rule, which is eroded by exceptions in the Code and in case law. See, e.g., id. § 2-508
(providing seller right to cure); Damashek v. Wang Labs., 540 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (App. Div.
1989) (holding that seller of defective computer disk drive must be given reasonable opportu-
nity to cure defect).
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pass the test. In all areas covered by Articles 2 and 2A, local transac-
tions among purely local participants predominate. Rather than a uni-
versal national practice, it is important that there be a significant national
practice in addition to the local practice. This national scope establishes
benefits by clarifying (making accessible) and unifying (eliminating con-
flicts in) local law.
It is in respect of this national principle that perhaps the greatest sea
change has occurred in contracts involving commercial services. Histori-
cally, services contracts involved intangible and nonstorable value. If I
hire a company to repair my office air conditioning system, the services it
provides are rendered on site and cannot be stored for later use. The
service provider must be present. In contrast, if I purchase an air condi-
tioner and install it myself, the seller never need visit or even know de-
tails about the location at which its product will be used.
Many modem services contracts retain this nonstorable and local-
ized character. But prior to the information, communications and trans-
portation explosions of the past several decades, this was the only option
for most commercial services. Services were delivered primarily by local
or regional participants. Either you brought the service provider to
where the value would be received or you brought the items to the ser-
vice provider. Because of difficulties of transportation, both options
tended to advantage local vendors over national enterprises. When
original Article 2 was written, most commercial services were provided
locally.
The world has changed. While many services are provided on a lo-
cal basis, vast amounts of commercial services are supplied by national
companies or by services vendors brought in from remote locations. The
illustrations are numerous. EDS processes data for companies through-
out the country. IBM services computers in all fifty states. Browning-
Ferris supplies waste management on a national and international basis;
H & R Block, tax services; Ernst & Young, accounting; Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue, lawyering; Gallup Corporation, opinion surveys; Pace
Entertainment, rock concerts; Mead Data, Lexis and Nexis electronic
database services; Hilton, hotel management. All of these are truly na-
tional services providers.
Equally important, through information technology and communi-
cations systems, vendors can work from remote locations. If desired, the
services output can usually be stored. Restraints in location and
storability, like impediments on travel, no longer impede national serv-
ices networks. A company delivers inventory data processing for a Texas
retailer from a computer located in Virginia. A law firm analyzes law in
[Vol. 26:725
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its Washington office for a client in Detroit. An advertising campaign is
designed in New York and delivered in Maine and Indiana for a Califor-
nia company. A computer program is designed and written in California
for a company in Florida to be used on a computer in Georgia. Credit
data are processed "on-line" by a company in Utah for companies
throughout the country.
Services contracts today involve a mix of nationally sourced and lo-
cal transactions. In this respect, they resemble the mix found in transac-
tions in goods. Yet, the transactions occur in a legal environment
characterized by a chaotic blend of common-law decision, local statute
and undocumented tradition. The need for codification is apparent.
D. Tailoring Principles
In a country characterized by instantaneous communications and
increasingly national commerce, contract-law codification is often appro-
priate as an alternative to patchwork common-law development of con-
tract law. Services are a national industry. They entail transactions of
volume and importance that can benefit from codification. As I indi-
cated before, this combination argues for a presumption that favors cre-
ating a codification project.
As a practical matter, however, this presumption could lead to
either of two positions. One could argue that we should incorporate the
area of services contracts within existing law on contracts for the sale or
lease of goods. This approach treats sales law as the dominant form of
commercial contract law. It force fits services within that model. The
alternative approach would argue for separate codification tailored to
services contracts. This treats both goods and services as basic commer-
cial contract-law topics that entail distinct policy and practice issues. In
part, the choice between these two options hinges on applying the uni-
queness principle to services contracts.
1. The uniqueness principle
The uniqueness principle states that one should codify contract rules
specially tailored to a topic if that topic presents unique questions of law
or practice. It is not necessary that the field be entirely unique. That
burden could not be met by any area of contract law, including sales and
leases, because all areas of contract law ultimately derive from similar
principles. The argument is, rather, that separate codification should
flow from differences in the type of issues faced and in their commercial
solutions such that a commercial uniqueness exists relevant to contract
form and expectations. One asks whether tailored rules better serve to
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bolster commercial contracting than reliance on rules codified for differ-
ent contexts and different transactions.
A subject matter that contains unique issues in this commercial
sense might justify an entirely separate, self-sufficient codification, such
as was done for leases. Ultimately, however, separate UCC articles on
sales, leases, licensing, services and other contracts would lead to gross
overlap and repetition. Indeed, for example, Article 2A on leases restates
many of the basic law sections of Article 2.
A "hub-and-spoke" approach is better. This distinguishes between
general legal principles that can be applied to sales, leases, licenses and
services and, thus incorporated into generally applicable UCC provi-
sions, as contrasted to specially tailored rules applicable to each area.
The general rules provide the hub, with spokes branching out from that
hub to provide special treatment of substantively unique, important
transactions. This drafting style is common in many codes. It blends
both growth potential and fundamental stability.
While services contracts are unique from sales of goods, this does
not argue that an entirely different contract law need be developed. The
unique issues in services contracts argue only that in some important
aspects, services contracting should not be handled by rules developed
for the sale of a drill press or a television. The context and content are
different. The differences in default rules demanded by the variations in
transactional expectations can be accommodated while also retaining (ac-
tually creating) similarity in rules such as statutes of frauds and limita-
tions, good faith, conscionability and the like under a hub-and-spoke
approach to Article 2.
Under either a separate article or a hub-and-spoke approach to
drafting, however, services contracts clearly qualify for treatment sepa-
rate from sales and leases of goods. Indeed, even seriously asking the
question of whether sales law adequately accommodates services con-
tracts indicates how dominated our minds are by a "goods bias." The
differences between services contracts and goods-related contracts are ap-
parent even from their terminology. We sell and lease goods, but we
perform services. An architectural firm designs a building. A computer
programming company develops a custom program. A market survey
firm conducts a study. A consulting firm advises a client. A maintenance
company repairs an elevator. An entertainer appears at a concert. A
movie studio produces a film. A company installs a communications sys-
tem. A security service monitors a warehouse. In a services contract,
one party provides effort, time or interpretive skill in return for valuable
consideration. The contract emphasizes personal or corporate perform-
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ance, rather than any product that the services provider delivers. Indeed,
a pure services contract delivers no tangible end product except perhaps
reports, diagrams or electronic documents. As a result, the identity of
the services provider often has greater significance than the final content
or timing of the services performed. In this field, one often encounters
issues about the transferability of contract obligations, the attention that
the services provider gave to the project, and the degree of care or skill
anticipated in the agreement. The rules applicable to these issues in sales
or leases of goods yield results that should be markedly different than in
the services context.15
Contracts in which the parties contemplate performance in the form
of action, thought or judgment, rather than delivery of a product, entail a
host of problems, drafting and legal issues that do not come into play in
the sale of property. In services contracts, one is interested more in gaug-
ing the adequacy of the provider's conduct, the quality of its effort, the
extent of the buyer's cooperation, and the proper compensation for par-
tially completed projects, than in determining whether the end product
fulfills original expectations.
In a services contract, the provider exchanges intangible value in
return for consideration (payment). As a consequence, many rules in law
pertaining to contracts for the sale of goods are not applicable to services
agreements. These include doctrines associated with "tender of delivery"
and "rejection or acceptance." These doctrines presume that delivery of
a tangible item defines performance under the agreement. In a services
agreement, however, a tangible item may not exist. Performance typi-
cally occurs over a period of time rather than in a single "tender of deliv-
ery." Once performed, services cannot be rejected or returned in the
same way as can a defective television. For services contracts, "rejec-
tion" means simply a refusal to pay for completed services and "return"
has no relevant meaning at all.
As a consequence, default rules defining the rights and remedies in
services contracts must differ from those in sales or leases of goods. The
law must balance the fact that the services provider often has relin-
15. Personal services contracts are not assignable unless made so by contract. "The reason
is that the personal qualities of the person who is to render the services, such as his ability,
skill, taste, integrity, dependability, and the like, are a material factor." Egner v. States Realty
Co., 26 N.W.2d 464, 469 (Minn. 1947); see also In re Alltech Plastics, 71 B.R. 686 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding patent license nonassignable). Of course, not all services agree-
ments carry with them the personal performance expectation necessary to create a non-
assignable agreement. See In re Rooster, 100 B.R. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); In re Sentry Data, 87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying Minnesota
law).
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quished something that cannot be returned or resold-its time and ef-
fort-and that the client may have received some value that it cannot
relinquish even if it desires to do so and even if the value received falls
short of what it contracted to receive. While in goods contracts, reme-
dies for a vendor's breach often present an all-or-nothing option requir-
ing acceptance or permitting full rejection and nonpayment, services
contract remedies must be gauged to achieve proper distribution of value
and loss. The cases emphasize a concept of substantial performance and
permit complete nonpayment only in the face of a material breach. The
receiving party must pay for the value it obtains in the agreement even if
that value falls short of the full expectations.
What constitutes a "defect" in performance is gauged differently in
services contracts than in sales contracts. The UCC implies a warranty
of merchantability, measured by reference to the average quality of simi-
lar goods, as a default rule for goods, subject to the right of the parties to
disclaim that warranty.
In a contract for services, in gauging the adequacy of performance
one might refer to the norms of reasonable performance in the trade or
profession, but that reference lacks the clarity of merchantability stan-
dards. It must always be prefaced by a limit based on the degree of skill
or insight reasonably associated with the services provider. The circum-
stances lend themselves to a reasonable person approach that closely re-
sembles negligence law standards.
Often, an ambiguity exists in defining the expectations in the agree-
ment. A contract for commercial services might merely demand the ef-
fort and skill of the particular service provider (an efforts contract), or it
might demand a result (a contract for a result). Was the services pro-
vider expected to provide "correct" advice (result) or simply to use its
time and judgment (effort)?
There are a host of other issues that need not detain us here. The
point is simply that the subject matter of a services contract generates
concerns and standard expectations different from those in sales of
goods. Sales law cannot simply be transported as a whole into the serv-
ices venue. Separate treatment reflecting commercial contract expecta-
tions is called for in this field.
2. The feasibility principle
Don Quixote was content to seek the impossible dream, but in law
we should be concerned with the feasibility of the projects we undertake.
Any codification must satisfy the feasibility principle. The task must be
one that can be achieved.
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One reaction to the idea of codifying commercial services contract
law is that the task is impossible. There is, the argument goes, too much
variety and too many commercially distinct issues. There is too much
local licensing and too many local regulations. There is, simply put, too
much here.
In the space available for this Essay, only two responses can be
made to this argument. First, the diversity in services contracts is
neither more nor less than the diversity in commercial goods contracts.
We have, over the years, learned to submerge the diversity in goods while
basking in comfort created by the general principles of Article 2. Thus,
we apply Article 2 rules on requirements contracts to transactions in-
volving aircraft engines, coal, oil and gas, motor vehicles and televisions.
We similarly apply standard warranty rules to vastly different transac-
tions involving diverse subject matters. We do so on the assumption
that, while details and commercial exigencies differ, there are fundamen-
tal aspects of the sale relationship that are amenable to rules tailored
broadly to the sale of goods. While it is not feasible to develop detailed
contract rules applicable to specific practice in all the varieties of services
contracts, it is possible to implement a code reflecting basic commercial
practices, expectations and principles.
Second, in codifying contract law one need not cover all contract
rules applicable to the particular area, but may focus only on basic rules
whose codification can aid in the evolution of contract practice. Article 2
does not codify all contract law applicable to sales. It leaves out much,
relying on general law to deal with topics in areas where codification was
considered unimportant or impossible. Article 2A appears more oriented
toward a complete statement of leasing law, but it too leaves out much.
The test for feasibliity is not whether a codification can rewrite all
contract law for services. The test is whether codifying some of the law
applicable to services contracts can benefit commercial practice by mak-
ing contract law more practical, contracting more efficient, and commer-
cial transactions more effective in the modem environment. In this
regard, there clearly is room for significant codification even if not com-
prehensive and detailed in scope.
IV. CONCLUSION
For years, the only scope questions in the UCC centered on whether
the existing rules could-or should-be extended to areas beyond their
original domain in individual contracts that fall on the cusp between Ar-
ticle 2 and common law. Now a more fundamental question has been
brought to the fore by modem, comprehensive revision of the UCC in a
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series of separate projects to revise individual articles of the Code.
Should a redrafted UCC cover new areas even if this requires new arti-
cles to the UCC or a new structure for the basic contract law contained
in Articles 2 and 2A?
Yes. With thorough revisions pending, what we do today represents
the contribution of this generation to uniform and codified contract law.
Modem commercial systems challenge basic assumptions in our law.' 6
These assumptions were formed in an industrial economy. The economy
has evolved in a fundamental shift from tangibles as the sole measure of
wealth to services and intangibles as major forces in commerce.17 Basic
precepts of law must be rethought in response to this change.'8
When we discuss commercial transactions, many of us assume that
we are talking about transactions involving goods or real estate. The
UCC centers on goods. Yet, in our modem economy, the commercial
services sector has already surpassed the goods sector in both the dollars
involved and the potential for future economic growth.
This represents fundamental change in how value is created and
what conditions encourage and support its transfer. This change must be
accompanied by an analysis of how commercial contract principles meet
and facilitate this change. The last war in commercial law involved ex-
amining and then codifying legal concepts to support trade and finance in
goods. The next war centers on commercial services and information
products. It is time to undertake the task of bringing this field of com-
mercial contracting into the UCC.
16. As to questions about property law, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 683
(1980); and Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
17. See John B. Shoven, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 46 (Charles E.
Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still
Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990).
18. DONALD A. MARCHAND & FOREST W. HORTON, INFOTRENDS: PROFITING FROM
YOUR INFORMATION RESOURCES 19 (1986) ("While we have been living with the conse-
quences of the information economy for many years, our understanding of these shifts in
human events has lagged behind the reality.").
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